From Drones to Politics: Europe's Security Landscape Is Shifting

For decades, peace has been one of the defining features of everyday life across much of Europe, but increasingly, reminders that this peace cannot be taken for granted are appearing much closer to home. 

A few weeks ago, while returning from Saarbrücken, I watched a Luftwaffe military exercise taking place nearby. From an aircraft above, around a dozen paratroopers descended one after another. There was nothing extraordinary about a military training exercise in itself, yet the scene stayed with me. It was a reminder that while daily life across most of Europe continues as normal, a major war is still being fought only a few hundred kilometres away and European countries are preparing for possibilities that would have seemed remote not so long ago. 

That contrast has become increasingly difficult to ignore. Russian officials continue to insist that Moscow has no intention of attacking Europe. President Vladimir Putin made that point again this month, saying Russia had no aggressive plans towards European countries. Yet similar assurances were heard before Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. That does not mean history will simply repeat itself, but it inevitably affects how such statements are received today. 

Germany-Russia tensions move beyond the battlefield 

What has changed particularly sharply in recent months is that the confrontation is no longer confined to Ukraine or even to the conventional military sphere. Germany, one of the European Union's central political and economic powers, has found itself at the centre of an escalating dispute with Moscow following a series of alleged hybrid incidents. The most striking recent example was the discovery of an explosive-equipped drone at Leipzig/Halle Airport, which the German government has attributed to Russia. Moscow has rejected the accusation. 

Germany has responded unusually bluntly. Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt said that police investigations, the methods used and intelligence findings together pointed clearly to Russian involvement behind the attempted attack. Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul went further, describing the incident as part of a broader series of efforts to destabilise, spread disinformation, threaten and sabotage Europe, saying that Russia's leadership was treating Germany with "blatant hostility". Berlin subsequently announced measures including the closure of the Russian Consulate in Bonn and the Russian House in Berlin, while stressing that its response was intended to remain proportionate and avoid escalation. Moscow has rejected the accusations. 

At almost the same time, concerns were growing around Germany's energy infrastructure. Economy and Energy Minister Katherina Reiche said the country's energy supply had apparently been deliberately targeted in a series of incidents involving power infrastructure, warning that attacks on electricity lines ultimately affect citizens, hospitals, telecommunications, businesses and local utilities. Federal prosecutors have also taken over investigations into suspected sabotage targeting substations and high-voltage infrastructure in Brandenburg, North Rhine-Westphalia and Saxony. These cases are not all attributed to Russia, and that distinction matters, but taken together they reinforce the sense that Europe's vulnerability increasingly lies not only at military borders but in the systems that keep ordinary life functioning. 

The pressure is not confined to infrastructure. It is also playing out in Europe's political landscape. 

Political pressure inside Europe 

The Alternative for Germany (AfD) secured a historic victory in Saxony-Anhalt on 6 September, taking around 44% of the vote and more than doubling its result from 2021, while Chancellor Friedrich Merz's CDU suffered a sharp defeat. That result should not be attributed to Russian influence. Domestic concerns over migration, economic performance, trust in established parties and dissatisfaction with Berlin all matter. But the broader context is difficult to ignore. The AfD has repeatedly advocated for closer relations with Moscow, opposed military support for Ukraine and benefited from a political environment in which distrust of institutions and fatigue with the war have become increasingly visible. 

France faces its own political test 

France may soon face a similar political test. With the 2027 presidential election approaching, recent polling has placed the Rassemblement National (RN) political party well ahead of its mainstream rivals. A July survey by the French Institute of Public Opinion (Institut français d'opinion publique - Ifop) put Marine Le Pen at 36% of first-round voting intentions, ahead of Édouard Philippe on 19% and Gabriel Attal on 15% in the scenarios tested. The poll also projected Le Pen winning the second round against each of those rivals, although Ifop stressed that such projections should be treated with considerable caution this far out from the election. 

The party's relationship with Russia has long attracted scrutiny. A French parliamentary inquiry reported that the then Front National took a €9.4 million loan from the First Czech Russian Bank in 2014 and described the party as having maintained "privileged links" with the Kremlin, including political contacts and positions aligned with Moscow on several international issues. Marine Le Pen has rejected suggestions that the party takes political direction from Russia. 

This is perhaps the less visible front of the confrontation. Russia does not need to control European elections to benefit from them. It is enough for European societies to become more divided over Ukraine, NATO, defence spending and the price they are prepared to pay for security. 

Europe's Eastern flank is already adjusting 

The Baltic states and their Nordic neighbours have already been forced to adapt to a security environment in which drones, airspace violations and electronic interference are becoming more frequent. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have all reported incidents involving military drones entering or approaching their airspace, while Finland said in September that four Ukrainian drones found on its territory earlier this year had been diverted by satellite navigation interference and wind. The distinction over whose drone it was matters, but so does the broader trend: the war is increasingly producing direct security consequences for countries that are not themselves combatants. 

In Britain, the Reform party had been gaining traction in political circles, and recent issues concerning its leader, Nigel Farage, not being able to explain a €5 million donation being dwarfed by the revelations this weekend of two £36 million donations - such significant financial resources could go a long way to challenging the status quo of the two-party system and veering the country towards a far right government. With Britain currently one of Ukraine's most staunch supporters, that would surely lessen if Reform got into power.

NATO has responded by upgrading its long-standing Baltic Air Policing mission into a broader air-defence role, giving allied pilots greater flexibility to respond to objects that pose a threat. Luxembourg also maintains a military presence in Lithuania as part of NATO’s Forward Land Forces. Lithuanian President Gitanas Nauseda said the previous air-policing mission had been designed for peacetime conditions, while Estonian Foreign Minister Margus Tsahkna said the upgraded format would allow faster responses to air threats. Sweden has also deployed Gripen fighter jets and a warship to Finland to reinforce surveillance and territorial protection amid what Finnish and Swedish officials have described as a deteriorating regional security situation. 

The line between war and spillover is narrowing 

On Thursday 10 September 2026, speaking in Bratislava, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk said Poland had averted a direct threat to one of its border crossings with Ukraine overnight and expected such crossings to be targeted as Russia strikes trade routes in an effort to weaken Kyiv economically. "Last night, thanks to cooperation between our services and their Ukrainian counterparts, a direct threat to one of the border crossings was averted," Tusk said. His comments followed a Russian drone strike on a Ukraine-Moldova border crossing in the Odesa region a day earlier, which killed two people. 

Moldova has also reported repeated Russian drone incursions. On Tuesday 8 September 2026, two Russian drones entered Moldovan airspace, one of them crashing and causing a fire while the other continued into Romania, according to Moldovan authorities. The incident temporarily closed Moldovan airspace and delayed several flights, including that of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky. 

The cumulative effect is difficult to dismiss. Europe is not facing one single type of threat, but a combination of military spillover, sabotage concerns, cyber and information pressure, political polarisation and repeated tests of how far individual states and NATO are prepared to respond. 

Luxembourg іs not outside this conversation 

Luxembourg has also reacted to the recent escalation in hybrid threats. On 2 September 2026, during an informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Wicklow, Ireland, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Xavier Bettel joined discussions on continued support for Ukraine and the need to increase pressure on Russia, with the ministers describing recent hybrid attacks against several EU Member States as a worrying development. 

Luxembourg's Foreign Ministry also expressed full solidarity with Germany following the drone attack at Leipzig/Halle Airport, which Berlin attributed to Russia, describing the incident as "a dangerous development" and part of Russia's growing hybrid threats against Europe. 

The discussion also comes against the backdrop of Luxembourg's National Resilience Strategy, presented earlier this year, which aims to strengthen the country's preparedness for major security-related disruptions, including threats to critical infrastructure and essential services. 

Peace still requires preparation 

None of this means that a wider war between Russia and NATO is inevitable, nor that every drone incident, infrastructure failure or political shift can be attributed to Moscow. But taken together, recent developments show that Europe is having to think about security far more broadly than it did only a few years ago. 

For me, the military exercise near Saarbrücken was a simple reminder of that change. Europe remains peaceful, but preserving that peace increasingly depends on readiness, resilience and the ability to respond clearly when new risks emerge.